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The Fiduciary Foundations of Federal Equal Protection 
Gary Lawson*  
Guy I. Seidman**  
Robert G. Natelson*** 
 
Abstract 
In Bolling v. Sharpe, the Supreme Court invalidated school 
segregation in the District of Columbia by inferring a broad “federal 
equal protection” principle from the Due Process Clause of the Fifth 
Amendment. It is often assumed that this principle is inconsistent 
with the Constitution’s original meaning and with “originalist” 
interpretation. 
This Article demonstrates, however, that a federal equal 
protection principle is not only consistent with the Constitution’s 
original meaning, but inherent in it. The Constitution was crafted as a 
fiduciary document of the kind that, under contemporaneous law, 
imposed on agents acting for more than one beneficiary—and on 
officials serving the general public—a well-established duty to serve all 
impartially. The Constitution, like other fiduciary instruments, 
imposes a standard of equal treatment from which lawmakers and 
officials cannot depart without reasonable cause. Although the 
Constitution’s original meaning does not precisely define the answers 
to all “equal protection” cases, and does not necessarily prescribe 
norms identical to those of existing equal protection jurisprudence, it 
clearly does prohibit racial discrimination of the kind at issue in 
Bolling. 
 
Bolling v. Sharpe1 and McCulloch v. Maryland2 are both iconic cases in 
American constitutional history. Beyond that status, they might appear to have 
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1   347 U.S. 497 (1954). 
 
2   17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819). 
2 
 
little in common. Bolling, decided on the same day as Brown v. Board of Education,3 
found unconstitutional federal laws providing for segregated schools in the District 
of Columbia.4 McCulloch affirmed Congress’s power to create and charter a national 
bank5 and denied the State of Maryland’s power to tax that bank. It is not obvious, 
at first glance, that anything of consequence connects the two decisions. 
 Yet certain commonalities between Bolling and McCulloch shape our 
understanding of a fundamental question regarding the American Constitution’s 
original meaning:6 Does the Constitution contain a general equality norm that 
constrains the federal government, as one of us has suggested?7  The question is 
profound as a matter of interpretation and important as a matter of practice if one 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
 
3   347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
 
4   See Act of May 20, 1862, ch. 77, § 35, 12 Stat. 394, 403; Act of May 21, 1862, ch. 83, §§ 1-3, 12 Stat. 
407, 407. Strictly speaking, the statutes did not require segregated schools but rather assumed that 
they would be segregated by providing separately for the education of “colored children.” 
 
5   See Act of April 10, 1816, ch. 44, 4 Stat. 266. 
 
6  The authors disagree somewhat on the interpretive force of the term “original meaning”—a 
common phenomenon among originalists.  See Lawrence B. Solum, Faith and Fidelity: Originalism 
and the Possibility of Constitutional Redemption, 91 TEX. L. REV. 147, 149 (2012) (“The words 
‘originalism’ and ‘originalist’ are ambiguous and used by scholars, lawyers, judges, and the public in 
a variety of different ways”). All of us use the term “original meaning” to describe the meaning that a 
hypothetical reasonable person in 1788 would have ascribed to the Constitution. See Gary Lawson & 
Guy Seidman, Originalism as a Legal Enterprise, 23 CONST. COMMENTARY 47 (2006). Two of us give 
“original meaning” primary place in constitutional interpretation. The other points out that lawyers 
and courts of the Founding Era generally interpreted legal documents, such as constitutions, 
according to the subjective understanding of the parties that entered into them, although in the 
many cases in which that understanding was not recoverable or coherent, original public meaning 
controlled. Robert G. Natelson, The Founders’ Hermeneutic: The Real Original Understanding of 
Original Intent, 68 OHIO ST. L.J. 1239 (2007).  These intramural disputes do not affect the analysis 
that we undertake in this article.  As often (though by no means always) happens, in this particular 
instance the various understandings of “originalism” converge to a common set of conclusions.  
 
7   See Robert G. Natelson, The Constitution and the Public Trust, 52 BUFF. L. REV. 1077, 1082-83, 
1173-74 (2004). 
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regards the Constitution’s original meaning as relevant for action.8  It implicates 
issues ranging from the facts of Bolling, to the permissibility of federal affirmative 
action programs, to the ability of the federal government to make distinctions in 
benefit programs on the basis of sex or sexual orientation. Doctrinally, the answer 
to the question has been a resounding “yes” at least since Bolling was decided in 
1954, and certainly since the line of modern cases that (mis?)reads Bolling as 
effecting a “reverse incorporation” of the Fourteenth Amendment’s equality norm 
that binds the states.9  But what about the answer as a matter of original meaning?  
Does the Constitution really contain such a norm? 
We believe that a principle that can plausibly, although with some important 
qualification, be described as a general equality norm applicable to all institutions 
of the national government derives from the Constitution’s original meaning. This 
                                                            
8   Many people believe that the Constitution’s meaning is at least one factor, or perhaps the 
determinative factor, for guiding real-world adjudications. Larry Solum calls this the “constraint 
principle,” Solum, supra note 6, at 154, and observes that “[a]lmost every originalist agrees that the 
original meaning of the Constitution should make a substantial contribution to the content of 
constitutional law.”  Id. That is a contingently accurate description of current empirical reality, 
but—as Solum correctly notes, see id. —there is nothing in originalism as a theory of meaning that 
logically entails any position about originalism as a theory of adjudication. See Gary Lawson, 
Originalism without Obligation, -- B.U.L. REV. – (2013). Claims about meaning are in the domain of 
interpretative theory, while claims about appropriate action are in the domain of moral and political 
theory. We suggest nothing in this article about the appropriate way, if any, to translate truths 
about constitutional meaning into action. Even if one believes in some form of the constraint 
principle, the relationship between interpretation and adjudication is much more complex than is 
often recognized. See infra at --. 
 
9   See Richard A. Primus, Bolling Alone, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 875, 988-89 (2004). Scholars from David 
Bernstein to Peter Rubin have noted that, doctrinally, Bolling makes much more sense as a 
straightforward substantive due process case than as a vehicle for some kind of “reverse 
incorporation” of the Fourteenth Amendment. See DAVID E. BERNSTEIN, REHABILITATING LOCHNER 
87-88 (2011); David E. Bernstein, Bolling, Equal Protection, Due Process, and Lochnerphobia, 93 
GEO. L.J. 1253 (2005); Peter J. Rubin, Taking Its Proper Place in the Constitutional Canon: Bolling v. 
Sharpe, Korematsu, and the Equal Protection Component of Fifth Amendment Due Process, 92 VA. L. 
REV. 1879 (2006). This seems right, though nothing in this article turns on how best to view Bolling 
as a matter of doctrine. 
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norm, however, stems from a different source and takes a different form than that 
applied in Bolling, subsequent cases, and prior scholarly commentary. 
Part I of this Article lays out the interpretative problem with trying to find 
an equality norm in the Constitution applicable to the federal government from 
scrutiny of the text alone.  Part I then sets forth an alternative source of such a 
norm: the fiduciary character of the Constitution and the rules of interpretation 
that flow from that character. As explained in Part I, the Constitution’s grants of 
power to federal actors and institutions are, in essence, grants to agents with 
fiduciary obligations, and this fiduciary understanding was inherent in Chief 
Justice Marshall’s opinion in McCulloch.10 
One of us has written elsewhere:  
The Constitution should be read through a fiduciary lens. A central 
purpose of the document was to adopt for America a federal 
government whose conduct would mimic that of the private-law 
fiduciary. Specifically, the purpose was to erect a government in which 
public officials would be bound by fiduciary duties to honor the law, 
exercise reasonable care, remain loyal to the public interest, exercise 
their power in a reasonably impartial fashion, and account for 
violations of these duties.11 
 
Part I thus explains what it means to read the Constitution “through a fiduciary 
lens”—in other words, how the character of the Constitution as an agency 
instrument affects how the document should be interpreted 
                                                            
10  To be clear: We think that Marshall’s opinion in McCulloch provides an appropriate interpretative 
framework because parts of it are well reasoned and identify objectively important features of the 
Constitution, not because it was authored by John Marshall or was printed in the United States 
Reports. 
 
11  Robert G. Natelson, The Legal Origins of the Necessary and Proper Clause, in GARY LAWSON, 
GEOFFREY P. MILLER, ROBERT G. NATELSON & GUY I. SEIDMAN, THE ORIGINS OF THE NECESSARY AND 
PROPER CLAUSE [hereinafter ORIGINS] 52, 52-53 (2010). 
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Finally, Part I raises the question whether fiduciary requirements govern all 
the Constitution’s grants of power or only some of them—-specifically the Necessary 
and Proper Clause.12 This latter question is highly relevant to Bolling, since 
Congress’s power over the District of Columbia stems from the Enclave Clause13 
rather than the Necessary and Proper Clause. In other words, if we disregard the 
putative basis of the Bolling decision, then the result was correct as a matter of 
original meaning only if the Constitution’s fiduciary principle governs power grants 
other than the Necessary and Proper Clause. 
Part II of this Article then explores the content of the fiduciary norms that 
underlie the Constitution, in particular the norm by which agents (in this case, 
officials of the federal government) must treat multiple principals or beneficiaries 
(citizens) impartially. After surveying fiduciary law as it existed at the founding, we 
show that the original meaning of the Constitution prescribes a general standard of 
equality from which the government may depart where it can show reasonable 
cause. But that is as specific a conclusion as we can reach: Eighteenth-century 
fiduciary law was not precise enough to yield anything less general. That is why we 
say that commonalities between Bolling and McCulloch “shape” our understanding 
of the role of equality in the original Constitution. They do not necessarily provide 
                                                            
12 U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 18. See generally ORIGINS, supra note 11, passim (suggesting that the 
word “proper” in that Clause was designed to communicate that laws authorized by the Clause must 
comply with fiduciary standards). 
 
13   See id. art. I,§ 8, cl. 17. 
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concrete answers, especially if one has an unduly specific conception of what 
answers to constitutional questions must look like.14 
Finally, Part II explains that this presumptive requirement of equal 
treatment applies to all federal power grants, not just to the Necessary and Proper 
Clause.  Accordingly, Bolling was correctly decided—and quite easily correctly 
decided—as a matter of original meaning. 
 In sum, the basic idea of “federal equal protection” has a firm grounding in 
original meaning, though the precise content of the relevant principle is (we expect 
to no one’s surprise) subject to considerable uncertainty. The original meaning of 
“federal equal protection” thus recreates—or, temporally speaking, creates—many 
of the puzzles that have plagued modern equal protection doctrine under the 
Fourteenth Amendment. 
 
I 
 
A.  The Misconceived(?) Quest for Federal Equal Protection 
 
Almost no one doubts that Section One of the Fourteenth Amendment15 
imposes a general equality norm of some kind on the states. There is vigorous 
                                                            
14   There is no a priori reason to suppose that the Constitution’s original meaning always will yield 
crisp, clear rules. The extent to which the Constitution prescribes highly specific answers is an 
empirical, not a theoretical, question. Perhaps (though we are not convinced) only very specific 
constitutional provisions are appropriate sources of law in adjudication, see Antonin Scalia, The Rule 
of Law As a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1175 (1989), but any such conclusion would have to 
come from a theory of adjudication rather than from a theory of meaning or interpretation. 
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disagreement about the scope and content of that norm, and even about which 
portion of the Fourteenth Amendment contains it,16 but there is general agreement 
that the Fourteenth Amendment contains some such equality norm, and we take 
that proposition as given in this Article. 
Bolling, however, imposed an analogous requirement of equal protection on 
the federal government. Justifying this popular doctrine is often thought—albeit 
much more often by nonoriginalists than by originalists—to pose a special challenge 
for advocates of originalism.17 
There is neither an “equal protection” nor a “privileges or immunities” clause 
in the Constitution applicable to the federal government.18 Instead, there are a 
number of clauses that mandate equal treatment in discrete contexts. Among these 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
15   See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (“No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge 
the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person 
of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction 
the equal protection of the laws”). 
 
16   Modern doctrine sees the Equal Protection Clause (“No State shall . . . deny to any person within 
its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws”) as the font of a general equality principle. Some 
originalists are inclined to see this provision as limited to the specific context of “protection” and 
therefore not extending to the conferral of benefits, such as access to public educational facilities, 
with a more general equality norm stemming instead from the Privileges or Immunities Clause (“No 
State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of 
the United States”). See, e.g., Steven G. Calabresi & Andrea Mathews, Originalism and Loving v. 
Virginia, 2012 B.Y.U.L. REV. 1393; John Harrison, Reconstructing the Privileges or Immunities 
Clause, 101 YALE L.J. 1385 (1992). We do not here engage any of those debates; our focus is on the 
eighteenth century, not the nineteenth century. 
 
17   See, e.g., DAVID A. STRAUSS, THE LIVING CONSTITUTION 130 (2010); William N. Eskridge, Jr., 
Some Effects of Identity-Based Social Movements on Constitutional Law in the Twentieth Century, 
100 MICH. L. REV. 2062, 2365 (2002) (asserting Bolling’s “incompatibility with originalism”); Jeffrey 
Rosen, Conservatives v. Originalism, 19 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 465, 471 (describing Bolling as “the 
Achilles heel of originalism”). 
 
18 Applicable to the federal government is the Privileges AND Immunities Clause, U.S. CONST. art. I, 
§ 2, cl. 1, which was designed to impose narrower rules. See Robert G. Natelson, The Original 
Meaning of the Privileges and Immunities Clause, 43 GA. L. REV. 1117 (2009). 
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are requirements of national uniformity for duties, imposts, and excises19 and for 
naturalization and bankruptcy laws.20 The commerce and taxing powers are limited 
by the qualification that “[n]o Preference shall be given by any Regulation of 
Commerce or Revenue to the Ports of one State over those of another . . . .”21 The 
Full Faith and Credit Clause provides that Congress can implement that clause 
only through “general Laws.”22 The Title of Nobility Clause,23 with its prohibition on 
government-sponsored castes, is another equality provision. The prohibitions on 
bills of attainder and ex post facto laws24 insure a level of generality in certain 
kinds of measures. However, these are all specific requirements of equality in 
specific circumstances. There is no express, overarching “equality” clause applicable 
to federal institutions. 
May one infer from these specific clauses some broader principle of equality 
that informs our understanding of the rest of the instrument?  This kind of 
maneuver from a set of clauses with a common theme to a deeper interpretative 
principle is a familiar part of American constitutional lore: examples include John 
                                                            
19   See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1 (“all Duties, Imposts and Excises shall be uniform throughout the 
United States”). 
 
20   See id. art. I, § 8, cl. 4 (granting Congress power to “establish an uniform Rule of Naturalization, 
and uniform Laws on the subject of Bankruptcies throughout the United States”). 
 
21   Id. art. 1, § 9, cl. 6. 
 
22   Id. art. IV, § 1. 
 
23  See id. art. I, § 9, cl. 8 (“No Title of Nobility shall be granted by the United States”). For an 
engaging account of this neglected clause, see JAY WEXLER, THE ODD CLAUSES: UNDERSTANDING THE 
CONSTITUTION THROUGH TEN OF ITS MOST CURIOUS PROVISIONS Ch. 8 (2011). 
 
24   See id. art. I, § 9, cl. 3 (“No Bill of Attainder or ex post facto Law shall be passed”). 
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Hart Ely’s attempted derivation of a principle of representation,25 Zephyr 
Teachout’s attempted derivation of an anticorruption principle,26 Heidi Kitrosser’s 
attempted derivation of a principle of substantive accountability,27 Gary Lawson’s 
attempted derivation of a principle of decisional independence,28 William O. 
Douglas’s attempted derivation of a right to privacy,29 and Roger Taney’s attempted 
derivation of a “treat even free Blacks badly” principle.30  Given that one of us has 
used (he thinks correctly) this sort of maneuver in the past, we are reluctant to 
condemn all instances of it out of hand. 
But this interpretive device must be used with great caution. After all, the 
most obvious interpretative inference in the face of multiple related clauses 
militates against this kind of interpretation: the specification of norms in certain 
distinct areas but not in others ordinarily suggests that no broader principle is 
intended.31 The more specific the instances—and the explicit equality-based 
provisions in the Constitution are indeed highly specific—the less likely it seems 
                                                            
25   See JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW (1980). 
 
26  See Zephyr Teachout, The Anti-Corruption Principle, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 341 (2009). For a 
spirited critique, see Seth Barrett Tillman, Citizen’s United and the Scope of Professor Teachout’s 
Anti-Corruption Principle, 107  NW. U. L. REV. 399 (2012). 
 
27   See HEIDI KITROSSER, RECLAIMING ACCOUNTABILITY: TRANSPARENCY, EXECUTIVE POWER, AND THE 
U.S. CONSTITUTION (2013) (forthcoming). 
 
28   See Gary Lawson, Controlling Precedent: Congressional Regulation of Judicial Decision-Making, 
18 CONST. COMMENTARY 291 (2001). 
 
29   See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 482-85 (1965). 
 
30   See Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 411-12 (1856). 
 
31 This norm is expressed in various rules of construction, of which the best known is Expressio unius 
est exclusio alterius—“the expression of one is the exclusion of the other.”  See ANTONIN SCALIA & 
BRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAW: THE INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL TEXTS 107-11 (2012). 
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that there is some broader norm lurking in the background. Sometimes a cigar is 
just a cigar. Sometimes a set of clauses with a common theme is just a set of clauses 
with a common theme, whose interpretative meaning is exhausted by those clauses’ 
content. 
Of course, it is possible that seemingly-related clauses are instantiations of a 
wider principle and that the expression of the principle in certain areas but not 
others is simply for emphasis or caution. In that case, though, there must be some 
evidence of that wider principle beyond the bare existence of a set of clauses with a 
common theme.32 
One might find such evidence of an equality theme in the very nature of law. 
Perhaps the concept of law itself encompasses at least a presumptive requirement of 
equal treatment. The long history of acts of attainder, private bills, and special 
interest legislation renders this a difficult argument to make. The Constitution 
renders the argument even more difficult, because of the ways in which the 
document uses the term “law.” In some instances, as in the phrase “due process of 
law”33 and (perhaps) “common law,”34 the meaning seems to include expansive 
norms. In most instances, however, when the Constitution uses the word “law,” it 
means only a statute.35  Other than compliance with certain procedural 
                                                            
32 That is, there must be evidence to rebut the normal presumption, expressed in constructional 
preferences such as the Expressio unius maxim, that the document does not impose the wider 
principle. 
 
33 U.S. CONST. amends. V, XIV. 
 
34 Id. amend. VII. 
 
35 E.g., id. art. I, § 2, cl. 3 & § 7, cl. 2. 
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requirements for the enactment of legislation and with other portions of the 
Constitution itself (such as the limits on federal power) nothing more is necessary to 
a federal “Law.” 
Alternatively, one might argue, as the Court did in Bolling, that a law 
denying equal treatment violates the Fifth Amendment’s prohibition on 
deprivations of “life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.”36  Such an 
argument, however, would apply only to actions effecting deprivations of life, 
liberty, or property, not to all federal action. Nor is this a plausible interpretation of 
the Due Process Clause, though to explain that point in depth would take us far 
afield. Suffice to say that “substantive due process,” of which this would be a specific 
application, may or not be a plausible interpretation of the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s Due Process Clause—but it is not a plausible interpretation of the 
Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause.37    
All of the foregoing suggests that the Constitution contains no specific text or 
set of texts that impose a general equality principle on the federal government. 
This, in turn, suggests that from the standpoint of original meaning the conclusion 
in Bolling was incorrect. 
Except that there are other often-overlooked sources of constitutional 
meaning that bear directly on this question. 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
 
36   Id. amend. V. 
 
37  See Ryan C. Williams, The One and Only Substantive Due Process Clause, 120 YALE L.J. 408 
(2010). 
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B. Founders and Fiduciaries: Interpreting the Marshallian 
Constitution 
 
 
Enter McCulloch v. Maryland. The specific issues decided in McCulloch shed 
little light on the question before us, but Chief Justice Marshall’s opinion, read for 
its broader framework, provides two interpretative keys vital to understanding the 
nature of the Constitution and the role that equality of treatment plays within it. 
Chief Justice Marshall deploys neither key in quite the way that we think he should 
have, but his analysis does suggest the correct path. 
The first key lies within one of the most famous, and probably one of the most 
misused, sentences in American constitutional history: “We must never forget, that 
it is a constitution we are expounding.”38 Here is the context in which Marshall 
wrote that sentence:  
Among the enumerated powers, we do not find that of establishing a 
bank or creating a corporation. But there is no phrase in the instrument 
which, like the articles of confederation, excludes incidental or implied 
powers; and which requires that everything granted shall be expressly and 
minutely described . . . . A constitution, to contain an accurate detail of all the 
subdivisions of which its great powers will admit, and of all the means by 
which they may be carried into execution, would partake of the prolixity of a 
legal code, and could scarcely be embraced by the human mind. It would 
probably never be understood by the public. Its nature, therefore, requires, 
that only its great outlines should be marked, its important objects 
designated, and the minor ingredients which compose those objects be 
deduced from the nature of the objects themselves . . . . In considering this 
question, then, we must never forget, that it is a constitution we are 
expounding.39 
                                                            
38  17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 407. 
 
39   Id. at 408-09. 
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Marshall was explaining that the interpretative presumptions one should 
apply depend in part on the kind of document one is construing. A constitution, said 
Marshall, is likely to be general rather than specific, so it would be a mistake to 
expect it to specify powers with much precision. Therefore, the absence of explicit 
powers to establish banks or create corporations should not weigh heavily against 
the existence of such powers. According to Marshall, one should interpret a 
constitution with the understanding that those who adopted the instrument 
intended to lay down general rules, not daily housekeeping details. 
 To thoughtful modern readers, Marshall’s observation about expected levels 
of generality seems obviously wrong. It is true that, as Marshall noted, a 
constitution detailed on many matters will be long, even if not necessarily “of the 
prolixity of a legal code.”  But there is nothing conceptually absurd or illegitimate 
about constitutional prolixity. The Constitution of India is more than twenty five 
times as long as the unamended U.S. Constitution and more than fifteen times as 
long as the Constitution with its twenty seven amendments.40  State constitutions 
are often much longer and more detailed than the federal Constitution.41 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
 
40   India’s constitution contains 117,369 words, see 
http://wiki.answers.com/Q/What_is_the_length_and_breadth_of_Indian_constitution (visited Apr. 15, 
2013). The American Constitution of 1788 contains 4,543 words, see 
http://www.archives.gov/exhibits/charters/constitution_q_and_a.html (visited Apr. 15, 2013), and 
with all twenty-seven amendments reaches 7,818 words. See 
http://www.snopes.com/language/document/cabbage.asp (visited Apr. 15, 2013). 
 
41   Alabama’s constitution exceeds 350,000 words, see http://voices.yahoo.com/the-alabama-state-
constitution-777-amendments-strong-103158.html (visited Apr. 15, 2013), though that number is 
misleading because the constitution contains numerous provisions involving local government and 
taxation. California’s constitution is eight times longer than the federal Constitution fairly and 
14 
 
In Marshall’s defense, it must be noted that the constitutions of his day did 
tend to be rather short documents. The unamended U.S. Constitution contained 
4543 words, the Articles of Confederation fewer than 3600, the longest state 
constitution (Massachusetts) about 11,400, and the constitution and declaration of 
rights of Virginia, Marshall’s own state, only about 3800.  Moreover, it may be that 
excessive length and detail reduce a document’s effectiveness as a constitution. Yet 
that supra-optimal length would not render it a “non-constitution.”  
 What make Marshall’s observation more difficult to justify, even in the 
contemporaneous context, are the variations in detail included in different parts of 
the U.S. Constitution. There are a number of subjects—such as the presidential 
selection procedures—on which the Constitution goes into very impressive detail.42  
There are other topics, of course, on which the Constitution is either terse or silent. 
But that means only that one cannot generalize about the expected degree of detail 
in the Constitution either from theorizing about the nature of constitutions or by 
making sweeping a priori judgments about this particular Constitution. One simply 
has to look topic by topic to see what level of detail is actually provided.43 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
squarely. See http://pacificvs.com/2009/08/18/a-brief-history-of-the-california-constitution/ (visited 
Apr. 15, 2013). 
 
 
42 U.S. Const. art. II, section 1, cls. 2-6 (containing 475 words). 
 
43 Thus, the real question for a case like McCulloch—and any other case—is more contextual than 
Marshall’s discussion lets on: Given the particular scheme of enumerated congressional powers in 
Articles I-V, does the absence of an enumerated power to incorporate a bank suggest that no such 
power is included in the grant of authority “[t]o make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper 
for carrying into Execution” other federal powers?”  That is a difficult interpretative question, but 
one is not advanced toward an answer by speculation about the specificity of constitutions. 
Constitutions can be long or short, detailed or vague; and the same is true of particular provisions 
within a constitution. The United States Constitution is, relatively speaking, on the short side, but 
15 
 
 But if Marshall was wrong on his precise claim, he was profoundly right in 
his broader point: one must never forget that it is a constitution—and not a 
shopping list, a poem, an inspirational speech, a Biblical passage, or a novel—that 
one is expounding. How one interprets a document is in some measure a function of 
what kind of document one is interpreting. The guidelines that govern 
interpretation of written instruments must be adapted to different categories of 
instruments. Documents designed to convey information are written and 
understood differently from documents designed to persuade, intrigue, or confuse. 
Accordingly, they require somewhat different communicative conventions. The 
powerful truth at the core of Marshall’s aphorism is that, in order to interpret the 
Constitution correctly, one must first have some conception of what kind of 
document one is interpreting. 
 The Constitution has been called many things. To recite only a few, it has 
been called a “superstatute,”44 a “compact,”45 a “treaty,”46 a “corporate charter,”47 an 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
its attention to detail varies quite significantly across topics. How specific it is on any given subject is 
an empirical, inquiry. 
 
44   Henry P. Monaghan, Our Perfect Constitution, 56 N.Y.U. L. REV. 353, 390 (1981). 
 
45  Edward A. Fallone, Charters, Compacts, and Tea Parties: The Decline and Resurrection of a 
Delegation View of the Constitution, 45 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1067, 1069 (2010). It must be noted 
that Professor Fallone was describing the “compact” theory, not endorsing it. Indeed, he argues 
roundly against it. 
 
46   Francisco Forrest Martin, Our Constitution As Federal Treaty: A New Theory of United States 
Constitutional Construction Based on an Originalist Understanding for Addressing a New World, 31 
HASTINGS CONST. L. Q. 269, 269 (2004). 
 
47  Geoffrey P. Miller, The Corporate Law Background of the Necessary and Proper Clause, in 
ORIGINS, supra note 11, at144, 147 (2010). 
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“instruction manual . . . for a particular form of government,”48 “a principal symbol 
of . . . the aspirations of the tradition,”49 and “a reflection of the tension between our 
understanding of our present state and our understanding of social ideals toward 
which progress is possible.”50  Some of these descriptions are closer and more 
helpful than others, but none of them—including the description that two of us 
suggested in 200651—is exactly on target. 
 The person who most aptly identified the Constitution’s character was James 
Iredell.52  Iredell was the North Carolina jurist and state attorney general (and 
later U.S. Supreme Court justice) who served as the chief spokesman for the 
Constitution at his state’s ratifying convention. In the course of arguing that the 
Constitution did not need to include a bill of rights (or at least a bill of rights more 
extensive than the one appearing in Article I, section 9), Iredell said: 
Of what use, therefore, can a bill of rights be in this Constitution, 
where the people expressly declare how much power they do give, and 
consequently retain all they do not? It is a declaration of particular 
powers by the people to their representatives, for particular purposes. 
It may be considered as a great power of attorney, under which no 
power can be exercised but what is expressly[53] given. Did any man 
                                                            
48   Gary Lawson & Guy Seidman, Originalism As a Legal Enterprise, 23 CONST. COMMENTARY 47, 52 
(2006). 
 
49   Michael J. Perry, The Authority of Text, Tradition, and Reason: A Theory of Constitutional 
“Interpretation,” 58 S. CAL. L. REV. 551, 564 (1985). 
 
50   Margaret Jane Radin, Reconsidering the Rule of Law, 69 B.U. L. REV. 781, 816 (1989). 
 
51   See supra note 47. 
 
52  See Robert G. Natelson, The Agency Law Origins of the Necessary and Proper Clause, 55 CASE 
WESTERN RES. L. REV. 243, 305 (2004). 
 
53 The word “expressly” should not be interpreted to mean that Iredell did not believe that the 
Constitution included implied powers. At the time, “expressly” could mean “not implied,” but it often 
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ever hear, before, that at the end of a power of attorney it was said 
that the attorney should not exercise more power than was there given 
him? Suppose, for instance, a man had lands in the counties of Anson 
and Caswell, and he should give another a power of attorney to sell his 
lands in Anson, would the other have any authority to sell the lands in 
Caswell?—or could he, without absurdity, say, “’Tis true you have not 
expressly authorized me to sell the lands in Caswell; but as you had 
lands there, and did not say I should not, I thought I might as well sell 
those lands as the other.” A bill of rights, as I conceive, would not only 
be incongruous, but dangerous.54 
 
Iredell was making two points relevant to our discussion.55  First, and most 
obviously, Iredell identified the Constitution as “a great power of attorney.”  This is 
essentially and profoundly correct. The Constitution is a grant of powers from a 
principal, identified in the Preamble as “We the People of the United States,”56 to 
various designees or agents.57  It has precisely the form, function, and feel of an 
agency instrument. Powers of certain kinds—some defined more precisely than 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
meant “clearly.” See ROBERT G. NATELSON, THE ORIGINAL CONSTITUTION: WHAT IT ACTUALLY SAID 
AND MEANT 206 (2d ed., 2011). 
 
54   4 THE DEBATE IN THE STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 148-
49 (Jonathan Elliot, ed. 2d ed., 1907) (emphasis added). 
 
55   Neither one is the point that Iredell thought was most relevant—namely, the superfluity, and 
indeed dangerousness, of a bill of rights. Whether Iredell was right about that point is beyond the 
scope of this paper. One of us has elsewhere agreed with him that a bill of rights was mostly 
superfluous. See Gary Lawson, The Bill of Rights as an Exclamation Point, 33 U. RICHMOND L. REV. 
511 (1999).   It is above our pay grade to determine whether the inclusion of a bill of rights in the 
Constitution has done more harm than good. 
 
56   U.S. CONST. Preamble. The phrase is located in the position the grantor (the King) traditionally 
held in royal charters granting powers and privileges. NATELSON, supra note 53, at 27. 
 
57   To be clear, we are making no claims that the Constitution actually, as a matter of political and 
moral theory, worked an effective, normatively binding transfer of authority from “We the People” to 
some set of governmental actors. Others have tried to use fiduciary theory to ground 
constitutionalism, see, e.g., EVAN FOX-DECENT, SOVEREIGNTY’S PROMISE: THE STATE AS FIDUCIARY 
(2011), but that is not our project here.  We are interested in constitutional meaning, not 
constitutional authority.  For purposes of ascertaining the meaning of the document, its pretension is 
more important than its reality. The Constitution’s character helps determine what it means. That 
character and meaning do not establish the truth or justice of any of its claims. 
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others—are vested in different actors, whose attributes, duties, and limitations are 
laid out with obvious and considerable care. To be sure, the Constitution does not fit 
precisely the mold of traditional private-law agency instruments: the recipients of 
power, such as Congress, the President, and the federal courts, are not literally 
private-sector executors, factors, stewards, or guardians. But advocates of the 
Constitution routinely described federal legislators and officials as “servants,” 
“trustees,” and “agents;”58 and the overall operation of the Constitution, as a grant 
of power from the principal to manage some measure of the principal’s affairs, is 
starkly indicative of the agency character of the document. Combined with the 
impressive background and contextual evidence indicating that constitutive 
governmental instruments were seen in agency-law terms in the eighteenth 
century,59 the most natural, and even obvious, reading of the Constitution treats it 
as an entrustment of identified powers to identified agents, precisely as Iredell 
described it. 
An alternative account, not necessarily inconsistent with Iredell’s, sees the 
Constitution as a corporate charter and government officials as corporate officers 
and directors. As long as one does not try anachronistically to import modern 
understandings of corporations or of the duties of corporate officers into the 
eighteenth century,60 we do not think that much of substance changes if one 
                                                            
58   See Natelson, supra note 11, at 55-57. 
 
59   See generally Natelson, supra note 7; for a shorter account, see D. Theodore Rave, Politicians as 
Fiduciaries, 126 HARV. L. REV. 671, 708-13 (2013). 
 
60  Teddy Rave may have fallen prey to this anachronistic thinking in his intriguing comparison 
between corporate law and the obligations of politicians. See Rave, supra note 58.   More 
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analyzes the Constitution as a corporate charter rather than as a power of attorney. 
In fact, there is considerable evidence that the founding generation, drawing upon a 
rich tradition in both England and America, viewed governments as corporate 
bodies.61  Moreover, corporate charters, like powers of attorney, represented a 
delegation of enumerated authority (in this case, from the sovereign) to named 
actors. 
Yet we think that Iredell was closer to the mark. Here again McCulloch 
proves instructive: If the Constitution had been “ordain[ed] and establish[ed]” by 
the States, it would have had more of a corporate character. This is because it would 
have represented a delegation by public authorities of some of their 
responsibilities.62  But because the Constitution was, as Marshall wrote, “ordain[ed] 
and establish[ed]”by “We the People” rather than by another governmental body,63 
it seems closer to a power of attorney by which “We the People” entrust to the 
government certain responsibilities. 
 Iredell’s the second point is that the Constitution’s character as a document 
has implications for the interpretative presumptions that apply to it. Marshall, as 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
substantively, Mr. Rave devotes most of his attention to the supposed fiduciary obligations of state 
governmental officials. Perhaps one can derive such obligations from individual state constitutions, 
see Natelson, supra note 7, at 1134-36, but the federal Constitution does not constitute the state 
governments, and it is thus difficult to view the federal Constitution as a source of state-officer 
fiduciary duties. 
 
61   See Mary Sarah Bilder, The Corporate Origins of Judicial Review, 116 YALE L.J. 502 (2006); Eric 
Enlow, The Corporate Conception of the State and the Origin of Limited Constitutional Government, 
6 WASH U.J. L. & POL’Y 1 (2001); Miller, supra  note 47, at 146-49. 
 
62  See Bilder, supra note 54, at 516-17. 
  
63  See 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 402-05. 
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we have seen, made the same point in McCulloch, even if his application of it was 
based on a dubious generalization about expected levels of specificity in 
constitutions. If the Constitution is a kind of power of attorney, it should be read as 
though it were a power of attorney and not, for example, a poem or inspirational 
speech. Both Iredell and Marshall were syllogistically correct to reason this way: (1) 
Agency instruments should be construed using a standard set of interpretative 
conventions for that class of documents, (2) the Constitution is an agency 
instrument, so therefore (3) the Constitution should be construed using a standard 
set of interpretative conventions for that class of documents. 
The next question is: What are the interpretative conventions for powers of 
attorney? Answering this question brings us to the second interpretative key from 
McCulloch. 
Agency instruments empower some people (agents) to act on behalf of other 
people (principals) over the sphere of activity defined in the instrument. This offers 
the benefits of specialization. It also entails the dangers of abuse: The dangers of 
abuse derive from that fact that even the best agents do not always have perfect 
knowledge, perfect motives, or perfect skills. The worst agents  . . . well, the facts 
appear throughout the course of human history. 
Accordingly, a well-drafted agency instrument identifies the range of 
activities over which the agents can exercise their authority, anticipates problems 
that may arise during their representation of the principal, and specifies limitations 
and constraints on those agents. To itemize such information in any given instance 
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might well require something of the “prolixity of a legal code.”  Nonetheless, because 
of the relative stability of human nature, many of the same kinds of problems recur; 
so the law of agency has developed certain default standards, principles, and rules. 
In other words, the mere existence of the agency relationship triggers background 
presumptions about the nature and scope of grants of power and about the 
responsibilities and duties of agents. Because these are only default standards, 
principles, and rules, the parties may alter them to fit the purpose of a particular 
instrument.  
 Marshall’s opinion in McCulloch is written as though it is blindingly obvious, 
to Marshall and everyone else around him, that the Constitution is an agency 
instrument that incorporated background presumptions familiar from other 
fiduciary contexts. (Marshall himself had said as much during the ratification 
debates.)64 
Recall that Marshall issued his aphorism about expounding constitutions in 
the context of determining whether Congress could charter a bank, even in the 
absence of a specifically enumerated power to do so. “But,” he wrote, “there is no 
phrase in the instrument which, like the articles of confederation, excludes 
incidental or implied powers; and which requires that everything granted shall be 
expressly and minutely described.”65  Here Marshall was referring to the doctrine of 
imcidental authority. This was the background principle of agency law whereby a 
                                                            
64  See Natelson, supra note 7, at 1038, 1086 & 1159. 
 
65  17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 406. 
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grant of authority to an agent ordinarily carried with it implied, subordinate powers 
that, although not specifically written in the instrument, were either necessary or 
customary to effectuate the express (“principal”) powers.66 These implied 
subordinate powers were referred to as incidental. 
The precise range of incidental authority varied with the context. For 
example, when a governing instrument was silent about whether a broker (then 
usually called a factor) could sell on credit, he might in some circumstances be 
permitted to sell on credit, but in other circumstances be limited to accepting cash. 
A land manager (then usually called a steward) enjoyed incidental authority to 
lease land in some circumstances, but not in others, when the governing instrument 
was silent on the subject. A factor sent to negotiate a sale of goods did not have 
authority to sell the principal’s entire business, even at a high price, unless the 
agency instrument expressly granted that power. Similarly, a land steward could 
make short-term rentals, but could not sell the fee simple without express 
authorization.67   A conspicuous portion of the fiduciary jurisprudence governing 
agents consisted of principles and rules defining what powers could be inferred as 
incidental in various contexts.  
Grants of power in agency instruments were read against these background 
conventions. A full understanding of the scope of an agency required not just 
reading the express (principal) powers listed in the instrument, but also considering 
                                                            
66   For a detailed discussion of the Founding-Era law of principals and incidents, see Natelson, supra 
note 11, at 60-68. 
 
67   See id. at 68. 
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the law of incidental powers governing that instrument. In some cases, the parties 
might vary the background law. For example, as Marshall noted in McCulloch, the 
Articles of Confederation altered the baseline rule for construing such instruments 
by specifying that no powers, however customary or useful, could be implied from 
the express ones.68  In the absence of an express exception, however, agency law 
provided the governing default rule. 
Marshall applied such a default rule in McCulloch. Today, we remember his 
treatment of congressional authority primarily for his interpretation of the word 
“necessary” in the Necessary and Proper Clause. But before Marshall reached that 
stage of his analysis, he spent seven pages of United States Reports trying to prove 
that the power to incorporate was a power of lesser dignity (that is, subordinate 
to)69 those expressly enumerated in the Constitution.70  If the power to incorporate 
was not of lesser dignity to the express powers to which it was allegedly attached, 
then there was no way it could be incidental, no matter how causally essential it 
might be to their execution.71 
In his discussion, Marshall recognized the Necessary and Proper Clause for 
what it was: a variation of a clause, very commonly found in agency agreements, 
                                                            
68  See ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION art. II (“Each state retains . . . every power, jurisdiction, and 
right, which is not by this confederation expressly delegated to this United States, in Congress 
assembled”) (emphasis added). 
 
69   The phrase most commonly used in the eighteenth-century jurisprudence was that a principal 
was always “more worthy than” its incident. See Natelson, supra note 11, at 61. 
 
70   See 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 413-21. 
 
71   See generally Gary Lawson & David B. Kopel, Bad News for Professor Koppelman: The Incidental 
Unconstitutionality of the Individual Mandate, 121 YALE L.J. ONLINE 267 (2011) (discussing the 
principal/incident distinction in the context of the Necessary and Proper Clause). 
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that communicated to the reader that the parties were not opting out of the usual 
rules of incidental authority. In this case, the clause affirmed that the agent 
(Congress) enjoyed powers not specifically identified in the governing instrument, 
but only if those powers were incidental to the enumerated, or principal, powers 
granted. 
 For our purposes, it does not matter whether Marshall was correct to 
conclude that the power to incorporate was incidental to some of Congress’s 
enumerated powers. What does matter is that he applied standard agency 
principles by inquiring whether the claimed power was subordinate to the 
enumerated principal powers. The principal/incident distinction was a governing 
background rule precisely because the Constitution was an agency instrument.72 
 Yet the background rules of agency law prevailing during the Founding Era 
(like the background rules of agency law today) included far more than the doctrine 
of incidental powers. They also imposed fiduciary obligations and limitations on 
agents. If factors, executors, guardians, and trustees were presumptively subject to 
an established set of fiduciary standards—and if the Constitution is an agency 
document, to be interpreted under agency principles—does not the Constitution 
impose on federal legislators and officials the same set, or at least a comparable set, 
of standards? 
                                                            
72   Chief Justice John Roberts, writing nearly two centuries later, understood the same point. See 
National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius, 132 S.Ct. 2566, 2591 (2012) (applying 
Marshall’s principal/incident distinction). For analysis of Chief Justice Roberts’ use of the principles 
of McCulloch, see Gary Lawson, Night of the Living Dead Hand: The Individual Mandate and the 
Zombie Constitution, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 1699, 1704-07 (2013). 
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 We think the answer is not simply yes, but obviously yes. In accordance with 
the Whig theory prevalent at the time,73 when the Constitution granted power to 
agents, it did so against the background of fiduciary law. Perhaps that law does not 
apply in precisely the same fashion to government officials as it does to private 
citizens, just as fiduciary standards vary somewhat among different kinds of private 
fiduciaries. But the underlying principles—that agents must exercise their 
authority with care, honesty, and attention to the interests of those who employ 
them—are as much part of the Constitution as the basic principles of English 
grammar. Federal officials are fiduciaries. 
We have explained elsewhere in some detail how the Constitution applies 
eighteenth-century fiduciary norms to federal executive and judicial actors.74  By 
the time of the founding, English public law routinely applied such norms to 
“executive” actors, a category that included judges. Specifically, the law imposed a 
requirement that executive power be exercised in accordance with standards of 
“impartiality, efficacy, proportionality, and regard for people’s rights.”75 The 
Constitution’s grants of executive and judicial power in Articles II and III carried 
with them the same standards. Two of us have called this the “principle of 
reasonableness,” but this is really just a translation of standard fiduciary norms 
into the public law context. 
                                                            
73  See Robert G. Natelson, The Framing and Adoption of the Necessary and Proper Clause, in 
ORIGINS, supra note 11, at 84, 107, 109. 
 
74   See Gary Lawson & Guy Seidman, Necessity, Propriety, and Reasonableness, in ORIGINS, supra 
note 11, at 120, 125-33. 
 
75  Id. at 120-21. 
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 Although the principle of reasonableness governed executive (and judicial) 
actors, it did not apply directly to the British legislature—that is, to Parliament.76 
This is because Parliament, unlike executive and judicial agencies, did not act 
pursuant to delegated power. However, the American Congress does act pursuant to 
delegated power: All the authority Congress possesses is delegated by “We the 
People” through the Constitution.  Fiduciary principles are implicit in that 
delegation. 
We previously have demonstrated that the word “proper” in the Necessary 
and Proper Clause refers to fiduciary standards: the use of “proper” clarifies that 
laws enacted under the Clause must comply with those standards.77 That 
conclusion is not relevant to Bolling v. Sharpe, because the statute at issue in that 
case was not adopted under the Necessary and Proper Clause. But the conclusion 
that fiduciary standards temper all federal powers matters a great deal Bolling v. 
Sharpe. To see why, we first explain some aspects of the fiduciary law that infuses 
the Constitution. 
  
II 
 
 It is a bit misleading to speak of the “fiduciary law” of the Founding Era as 
though it was a unified doctrine. “Eighteenth-century fiduciary law was somewhat 
                                                            
76   See id. at 134. 
 
77   See generally ORIGINS, supra note 11. 
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fragmented, encompassing a wide spectrum of actors—administrators of estates, 
attorneys (both public and private), bailiffs, executors, factors, guardians, servants, 
stewards, and trustees.”78  Nonetheless, one could generalize across these different 
contexts to deduce a common core of obligations imposed on all fiduciaries: the duty 
to stay within the limits of granted authority, the duty to act with loyalty and in 
good faith towards the principal, the duty of care, the duty to exercise personal 
discretion rather than delegate authority to another agent, the duty to account to 
the principal, and the duty to act impartially toward multiple principals.79  Any of 
these duties could be altered, added to, or subtracted from by the terms of a specific 
instrument, but they were the default norms governing agency relationships. 
 For our purposes, the most important of these baseline duties was the 
fiduciary duty of impartiality. This was the requirement that one acting as a 
fiduciary treat multiple beneficiaries in an impartial manner. For example, an 
executor or trustee called upon to make distributions to a class of beneficiaries 
generally could not discriminate unfairly among the beneficiaries. In an agency 
context, the duty meant that an agent had to treat his principals in an impartial 
manner. 
There were many occasions in which a private agent might serve more than 
one principal: for example, a factor might represent a consortium of merchants, or a 
broker dealing with stock might owe duties both to the purchaser and to a secured 
                                                            
78   Natelson, supra note 1, at 56-57. 
 
79   See id. at 57-59. 
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lender. This is precisely the kind of multiple-principal agency arrangement created 
by the United States Constitution. Two of us have elsewhere argued that, for 
interpretative purposes, the principal who “ordain[ed] and establish[ed]” the 
Constitution must be viewed as a single hypothetical person.80  But that is because 
of the nature of interpretation of jointly-authored documents. For purposes of trust 
law, there is no need for fictions about hypothetical authors or principals. In that 
context, “We the People” is plural (as indicated by the reference in the Preamble to 
“ourselves”), and once the document is “ordain[ed] and establish[ed],” the principals 
to be served by authorized government agents are real-life, concrete people.81 In 
other words, the Constitution created a regime in which agents were empowered to 
manage some portion of the affairs of multiple principals. This imposed on those 
agents the fiduciary duty of impartiality. 
How does this duty of impartiality require the agents to treat the principals 
they serve? Must they treat all of them equally? 
 Eighteenth-century private law does not provide an answer as crisp as one 
might like, but it does contain some illuminating suggestions.  For our purposes, the 
most illustrative cases form a line of English decisions extending from the 
seventeenth to the beginning of the nineteenth centuries. These cases involve 
exercises of powers of appointment under instructions to benefit named or described 
                                                            
80   See Lawson & Seidman, supra note 73, at 61-67. 
 
81   How do we know that the instrument is established for the benefit of the people rather than for 
the benefit of the agents themselves?  Because the instrument tells us that its purposes are “to form 
a more perfect Union, to establish Justice, insure domestic Tranquility, provide for the common 
defense, promote the general Welfare, and secure the blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our 
Posterity . . . .”  U.S. CONST. Preamble. 
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persons, where those instructions left room for the power-holder to exercise 
discretion. Those powers are somewhat analogous to the federal spending powers82 
in that they involve authority to expend entrusted resources. This is a rather 
important context when considering the actions of governments. 
By the seventeenth century, it was well established that “[e]quity will in 
many Cases control the unequal Acts of Trustees, Guardians, &c, though by the 
Deed or Will they are vested with a discretionary or arbitrary Power.”83  For 
example, in Gibson v. Kinven, a man left property by will to his wife “upon trust and 
confidence that she would not dispose thereof but for the benefit of her children.”84  
The wife left impressive gifts to two of the surviving children but left only five 
shillings to the third child. That child sued to set aside the distribution although 
nothing in the governing will specifically constrained the wife’s discretion. The 
defendant children explained the disparity by observing that, “the plaintiff had by 
some means disobliged her mother in her lifetime: and though they had endeavored 
to reconcile them, and to persuade the mother to leave the plaintiff her daughter a 
better legacy, yet they could not prevail with her to do it.”85 The case report tells us 
                                                            
82   We believe that the federal spending power comes from certain specific grants, such as the power 
to “Error! Main Document Only.support Armies” and “maintain a Navy” (U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, 
cls. 12 & 13), and, as to grants that do not include such explicit authorization, from the Necessary 
and Proper Clause rather than (as modern doctrine has it) from the Taxation Clause. See GARY 
LAWSON & GUY SEIDMAN, THE CONSTITUTION OF EMPIRE: TERRITORIAL EXPANSION AND AMERICAN 
LEGAL HISTORY 26-32 (2004). For present purposes, the source of the spending power does not 
matter, as long as such power exists somewhere. 
 
83   Craker v. Parrott (1677) 2 Chan. Cas. 228, 22 Eng. Rep. 921, 922.. 
 
84   Gibson v. Kinven (1682) 1 Vern. 66, 23 Eng. Rep. 315, 315 (1682) (italics in original). 
 
85   Id. 
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that the chancellor “decreed for the plaintiff; for that the distribution in this case 
was so very unequal, and that without any good reason shewn to warrant it; and 
therefore he thought fit to rectify it in this case, and could not do it otherwise than 
by decreeing an equal distribution.”86 
A case decided five years before, Craker v. Parrott, had been to the same 
effect;87 and four years after Gibson, equity claimed jurisdiction to intervene in the 
exercise of a similar power of appointment. That case, Wall v. Thurbane,88 appears 
to have settled before decision. 
Equity continued to review for potential unfairness in exercises of even open-
ended powers of appointment. The cases to that effect, from Gibson v. Kinven 
forward, were exhaustively collected and analyzed in 1801 in Kemp v. Kemp,89 by a 
judge who openly declared that he did not want to have to intervene in such matters 
but felt compelled by longstanding precedent to do so.90 
Equity similarly imposed a duty of impartiality outside the context of powers 
of appointment. Thus, when a factor represented multiple principals and the buyer 
failed to pay, the principals had to share the loss equally: 
 One and the same factor may act for several Merchants, who 
must run the joynt risque of his actions . . . ; as if five Merchants shall 
remit to one Factor five distinct Bales of Goods, and the Factor makes 
                                                            
86   Id. at 315-16. 
 
87   See 22 Eng. Rep. at 922. 
 
88   (1686) 1 Vern. 415, 23 Eng. Rep. 555, 555. 
 
89   (1801) 5 Ves. Jr. 849, 31 Eng. Rep. 891. 
 
90   See id. at 897. 
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one joynt Sale of them to one Man, who is to pay one moiety down, and 
the other at six Months end; if the Vendee breaks before the second 
payment, each man must bear an equal share of the loss . . . .91 
 
 From such cases, we might conclude that the duty of impartiality always 
required equal treatment of beneficiaries or principals. But this is not quite true.  
Instruments at issue in later cases seemed to give the power-holder broader 
authority than that enjoyed in the Gibson and Craker cases. 92 After some balking,93 
the courts began to honor this language by, in proper instances, upholding unequal 
distributions. 
Thus, in Burrell v. Burrell,94 a wife charged by a testamentary power of 
appointment to provide her children “such fortune as she should think proper or 
they deserve,”95 made only token provision for a son who already had a substantial 
income as result of past actions by the original testator. The court held that she 
“had executed the power [of appointment] very properly, considering the provision 
                                                            
91  3 CHARLES MOLLOY, DE JURE MARITIMO ET NAVALI, OR A TREATISE OF AFFAIRS MARITIME AND OF 
COMMERCE 466 (7th ed., 1722). 
 
92   Drafters were always free to authorize, or even mandate, unequal treatment of beneficiaries. For 
example, when a power of appointment authorized distribution “to one or more of the children then 
living, in such manner as his wife, whom he had made executrix, should think fit,” Thomas v. 
Thomas, 23 Eng. Rep. 928 (1705) (emphasis added), it was permissible to make the entire 
distribution to one child, because while “an unreasonable and indiscreet disposition may be 
controlled by a Court of Equity . . . , it is expressly provided, that she might give all to one.”  Id. 
Subsequent case law made clear that language of this sort was both necessary and sufficient to allow 
full dispositions to one member of the potential beneficiary class. See Kemp, 31 Eng. Rep. at 895. 
 
93   E.g., Astry v. Astry (1706) Prec. Ch. 256, 24 Eng. Rep. 124 (mandating equality despite 
instrument seeming to grant wide discretion: “in such proportions as she should think fit”). For 
examples of the subsequent approach in addition to Burrell, see Maddison v. Andrew, (1747) 1 Ves. 
Sr. 58, 27 Eng. Rep. 889; Alexander v. Alexander (1755) 2 Ves. Sr. 641, 28 Eng. Rep. 408. 
 
94   (1768) Amb. 660, 27 Eng. Rep. 428. 
 
95   Id. at 428. 
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which the son was entitled to . . . .”96  In other words, if the instrument and 
underlying facts offered good reason to do so, in some circumstances even wildly 
unequal treatment was proper. When enforcing such instruments, as the court 
explained in Kemp, the law presumed merely that each beneficiary should receive 
something substantial, or not “illusory,”97 but not necessarily something equal to the 
other beneficiaries.98 
This is not a surprising result: Not only had the creator of the instrument 
emphasized the breadth of the power-holder’s discretion, but a strict focus on 
equality raises the age-old problem of defining the dimensions along which equality 
is going to be measured. Does giving every beneficiary the same amount constitute 
equal treatment when one of those beneficiaries already has an enormous income 
from prior actions of testator?  It depends on what is being measured as equal or 
unequal. Moreover, the law was not concerned with seemingly inequitable 
distributions in the abstract but with seemingly inequitable distributions for which 
there was no good cause, no apparent reason. As the rule was expressed in 1706, 
where a power is given to make distributions to children, the holder of the power of 
appointment “must divide it amongst them equally, unless a good reason can be 
given for doing otherwise.”99  Later cases also emphasized the importance of giving 
                                                            
96   Id. at 429. 
 
97   Astry v. Astry (1706) Prec. Ch. 256, 24 Eng. Rep. 124. 
 
98   See 31 Eng. Rep. at 896-98. 
 
99   Astry, 24 Eng. Rep. at 124 (emphasis added). 
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reasons for seemingly unequal or unfair treatment,100 though by 1801 at least one 
judge (concededly hostile to the entire line of cases) doubted whether equality was 
the proper baseline,101 maintaining instead that “it is perfectly clear . . . , if some 
very good reason does not appear . . . for giving a very small sum to one, such a 
disposition cannot be allowed.”102 
 Thus, the essence of the law was that unexplained or unjustified unfairness 
in the distribution of assets was a violation of an agent’s fiduciary duty, even when 
the instrument granted the agent seemingly limitless discretion. Under certain 
circumstances, fairness and equality overlapped, such as when unequal treatment 
(however “unequal” was defined in that context) was per se unfair. Indeed, when no 
better result was obvious, equal treatment was the default rule. But in other 
circumstances, fairness required some accommodation to everyone, although not 
necessarily the same accommodation. 
 Convenience justifies fixing as a baseline a presumption of equality of 
distribution of burdens (as in the case of merchants who suffered losses from 
nonpayment) or benefits (as in the distribution of assets under a power of 
appointment). However, the courts permitted deviations from the baseline when 
good reasons supported a deviation. The result was a judicial requirement of fair or 
                                                            
100   See Kemp, 31 Eng. Rep. at 893 (“the point is whether, under such a power she could make such 
[unequal] distribution; assigning no reason for so doing. For that there is no authority.”) (argument 
of counsel). 
 
101   See id. at 896 (saying of Astry’s emphasis on equality: “That I take not to be the rule of the Court 
now”). It is not clear whether the judge was taking into account the greater discretion allowed in the 
later instruments. 
 
102   Id. 
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reasonable treatment. This might or might not translate into a requirement of equal 
treatment, depending upon circumstances. 
 During the period before the founding, the same themes appeared in public 
sector agency law. The seminal decision was Rooke’s Case,103 about which two of us 
have written elsewhere.104  A statute gave sewer commissioners power to make 
repairs to water-control utilities “as case shall require, after your wisdoms and 
discretions.”105 The costs were to be assessed on affected landowners as the 
commissioners “shall deem most convenient to be ordained.”106 In Rooke’s Case, the 
commissioners had assessed all of the costs of repair to a river bank on one 
landowner, despite the fact that “divers other Persons had Lands to the Quantity of 
800 Acres within the same level, and subject to Drowning, if the said bank be not 
repaired . . . .”107  As reported by Sir Edward Coke, the court ruled that the 
commissioners exceeded their authority, even though the statute seemed to give 
them unlimited discretion to assess repair costs as they saw fit: “[N]otwithstanding 
the Words of the commission give Authority to the commissioners to do according to 
their Discretions, yet their Proceedings ought to be limited and bound with the Rule 
of Reason and law.”108 As no reason was evident why just one landowner should 
                                                            
103   (1598) 5 Co. Rep. 99b, 77 Eng. Rep. 209. 
 
104   See Lawson & Seidman, supra note 73, at 122-23, 137-38. 
 
105   23 Hen. 8, c. V, § 3, cl. 2 (1531), 4 Stat. at Large 223, 224 (1763). 
 
106   Id. cl. 3. 
 
107   77 Eng. Rep. at 209. 
 
108  Id. at 210. 
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bear the entire cost of repair, the assessment was invalid. Rooke’s Case noted that 
the applicable statutes required equality, which, it observed was consistent with the 
equitable law of bankruptcy,109 so that “the commissioners ought to tax all who are 
in danger of being damaged by the not repairing equally.”110 
Equality of treatment also played a significant role in Keighley’s Case111 in 
1609, eleven years after Rooke’s Case. In Keighley, the commissioners again sought 
to place the entire burden of keeping a wall in good repair on one landowner, while 
the court ruled that the commissioners “ought to tax all persons who hold any lands 
or tenements . . . according to the quantity of their land . . . .”112  Here a particular 
measure of equality—payment in accordance with amount of land—was put forward 
as the explicit baseline. Thus, Keighley went beyond holding that one landowner 
should not have borne the entire burden; it further held that all landowners should 
have borne their proportionate burdens. 
Rooke’s Case and Keighley’s Case demonstrate that, as early as the sixteenth 
century the courts were applying fiduciary standards to public officials somewhat 
comparable to those imposed on private agents.113  If this public fiduciary law was 
part of the background against which the Constitution was “ordain[ed] and 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
 
109   Id. at 210 (“said statutes require equality, which well agrees with the rule of equity”). 
 
110   Id. at 209 (emphasis added). 
 
111   (1609) 10 Co. Rep. 139a, 77 Eng. Rep. 1136. 
 
112   Id. 
 
113   English political writers and speakers also were drawing comparisons between government and 
trust duties as early as the sixteenth century.  See Natelson, supra note 7, at 1101-23. 
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establish[ed]”—and we think it more than clear that it was—then what does it tell 
us about the obligations of federal government officials operating under a “great 
power of attorney”? 
It is easy to say that executive and judicial actors, who, like the English 
sewer commissioners, exercise delegated, implementational power, are bound to 
exercise their discretionary authority with care, loyalty, and impartiality.114  Does 
the obligation of “impartiality” require equal treatment of all beneficiaries (or, in 
the agency context, principals) along all possible understandings of equality?  Of 
course not.  But it does mean that executive and judicial actors have to explain why 
they are treating people as they do whenever the reasons for the different treatment 
are not obvious. Equality of treatment is a plausible baseline from which to begin. 
One can deviate from that baseline in certain circumstances, or even decide that a 
different baseline is appropriate, but one will need reasons for so doing. The 
President does not, for example, need to commit law enforcement resources in a 
manner proportional to population. But if he varies from the requirement of a rough 
equality, he should be able to show reasonable cause for doing so. An allocation 
grossly unequal in some important respect (favoring, let us say, Chicago over 
Houston) requires some explanation. 
Is the same true of legislation?  There is no obvious reason why not. Members 
of Congress are fiduciary agents just as presidents and federal judges are. They, too, 
exercise delegated power, and only delegated power, derived from the principal who 
                                                            
114  And so we have said at some length elsewhere.  See Lawson & Seidman, supra note 74. 
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empowered them: “We the People.” Accordingly, they owe fiduciary duties to the 
principals whose affairs they manage. Once again, equality should serve as a 
baseline, and deviations from the baseline should be supported by reasonable cause. 
Thus, it is partly misleading to say that the fiduciary obligations of federal 
officials under the Constitution include a duty to provide “equal protection.” That 
formulation suggests concrete conceptions of equality that must be strictly followed. 
Instead, one perhaps should speak of “fair protection,” or perhaps even more 
accurately “reasoned protection.” The fundamental obligation of the fiduciary is not 
always to treat beneficiaries or principals in equal circumstances equally, but not to 
treat them unequally without good reason. There are contexts in which unequal 
treatment is prima facie, or even per se, unreasonable, and in those circumstances 
the requirement of “reasoned protection” folds into one of “equal protection.”  But 
those will be special cases of the broader principle. 
In what sort of context might fiduciary obligations require equal treatment?  
The obvious answer is, “Contexts in which the stated (or unstated) grounds for 
distinction proposed by the agent are not supported by any reasonable cause.” For 
example, when the purpose of a will that includes a power of appointment is to 
effectuate the presumed intent of the testator, there is reasonable cause for 
differential distributions under the will’s power of appointment when the testator 
himself already provided one of the children with a large income. There is no 
reasonable cause, however, for differential distributions because one of the children 
has “disobliged” the person making the appointment, where the purpose of the 
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distribution was to effectuate the presumed intent of the deceased father. Some 
reasons simply do not make sense in the context of particular agency 
relationships.115  The fact that one cannot give precise or determinate content to 
this norm does not mean that the norm has no force or cannot be applied. It may 
well result in some very difficult cases, but that is why judges and lawyers are paid. 
There are some easy cases as well. Does it make any sense for government 
officials to discriminate on the basis of race?  In Plessy v. Ferguson,116 a majority of 
the Supreme Court thought so—finding segregation, allegedly without disparate 
treatment, to be “reasonable.” In reaching that conclusion, however, the majority of 
the Justices not only disingenuously denied that segregation was designed as a 
badge of black inferiority, but they also were notably deficient in identifying 
allegedly reasonable bases for separation of the races. The reasons they did offer 
were “the established usages, customs and traditions of the people”117 (without 
noting that strict segregation in the South was a fairly new, post-bellum 
phenomenon) and “comfort, and the preservation of the public peace, and good 
order” (thereby making the bigotry of some principals a justification for punishing 
other principals). 
                                                            
115   Context matters. To use a farcical example, would it be unreasonable for someone exercising a 
power of appointment to deny a beneficiary a share because that beneficiary was a vegan? That 
might depend on the presumed intent of the person creating the instrument. For example, suppose 
the person creating the instrument had made his fortune from operating a slaughterhouse? 
 
116   160 U.S. 537 (1895). 
 
117   Id. at 550. 
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 On the other hand, one might think of circumstances where disparate racial 
treatment made sense. It would not, for example, be irrational to deny an FBI agent 
a potentially career-advancing undercover assignment because the agent is black 
and the assignment calls for infiltrating the Aryan Nation. Moreover, some have 
argued that it is reasonable for a state prison system to segregate prisoners by race 
when necessary to control gang violence.118  Still others have contended that racial 
discrimination is permissible to create a racially diverse environment in institutions 
of higher learning.119 But the latter instances plumb the outer boundaries of 
plausible arguments. In the overwhelming majority of cases, it will be next to 
impossible to find any good reasons for that kind of discrimination. Indulging in it 
would appear to be a clear violation of the fiduciary duty of government agents. 
Is there a wider range of circumstances in which the federal government 
would have good cause to discriminate on the basis of sex rather than race? On the 
basis of sexual orientation? On the basis of wealth?  If the presumptive requirement 
of fiduciary law is equal treatment of principals/beneficiaries, it is hard to see how 
one could avoid asking these kinds of questions. To answer them, of course, requires 
knowing some things that are very difficult to know: What counts as  
“reasonable cause” for an action?  Do reasons for actions have to be tailored to 
individual circumstances or may they be based upon generalizations? If the latter, 
how accurate do those generalizations need to be? What classes of people are 
appropriate for generalizations?  How compelling do the government’s reasons for 
                                                            
118   See Johnson v. California, 543 U.S. 499, 523-24 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
 
119   See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 328-33 (2003). 
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actions have to be in different circumstances?  Do those reasons need to have the 
same force regardless of the basis for the differential treatment and regardless of 
the characteristics of the people burdened and benefited by the action?  Does 
discrimination on the basis of race require a stronger, weaker, or identical strength 
of reason than discrimination on the basis of sex?  Do the reasons require the same 
force when one is considering (a) the administration of benefit programs, (b) the 
operation of a prison system, or (c) the management of the military? What would a 
jurisprudence involving judicial enforcement of this kind of fiduciary duty look like? 
We have seen how differences in the wording of instruments induced the 
English courts to be more or less tolerant of inequities of treatment. Is the same 
true of different provisions in the Constitution? For example, if a constitutional 
provision contains one sort of “equal protection” provision (such as the requirement 
that bankruptcy laws be uniform), does that suggest that other kinds of equality 
standards are not to be added? Suppose the history behind a provision suggests that 
discriminatory treatment was expected? The Commerce Clause was adopted with 
the understanding that it would permit Congress to lay discriminatory regulations 
against certain goods. Should that make a difference? In Fourteenth Amendment 
Equal Protection Clause cases, courts give heighted protection to racial groups 
precisely because of that Clause’s central purpose and history.  
We do not intend even to begin to answer this list of questions. Instead, we 
want to emphasize three features of the list. First, it recreates almost perfectly the 
set of questions raised (if not always directly addressed) by modern equal protection 
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doctrine.120 The original “federal equal protection” doctrine found in the 
Constitution of 1788 is likely to give rise to the same kinds of problems, 
conundrums, and value choices with which the law has wrestled for a century and a 
half when trying to understand the Fourteenth Amendment. 
Second, while the questions are likely to be very similar under the federal 
fiduciary and Fourteenth Amendment “equal protection” doctrines, it is not at all 
certain that the answers will always be the same.  The Constitution did not create 
the state governments and therefore, in most instances, does not function as a 
“great power of attorney” with respect to the States.121  Fourteenth Amendment 
equal protection doctrine springs from the text of a particular constitutional 
amendment rather than from the general fiduciary character of the Constitution.  
Accordingly, the interpretive rules that accompany the Constitution and create a 
presumptive requirement of equal treatment by federal officials, do not necessarily 
apply to questions involving the States. 
Perhaps, at the end of the day, there will be substantial overlap between the 
fiduciary constraints on imposed on federal agents and the Fourteenth Amendment 
constraints imposed on state agents, but there is no a priori reason to expect them 
to be identical.  Chief Justice Warren in Bolling wrote that “it would be unthinkable 
                                                            
120   Compare our list of questions to the summary of equal protection law found in a leading 
constitutional law casebook.  See MICHAEL STOKES PAULSEN, STEVEN G. CALABRESI, MICHAEL W. 
MCCONNELL & SAMUEL L. BRAY, THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 1511-12 (2010). 
 
121   There are limited contexts, such as the provisions empowering state governments to act in 
connection with federal elections and the power of state legislatures, under Article V, to apply for 
amendments and designate convention delegates, in which “federal equal protection” standards 
might well apply to States in the same fashion that they applies to the federal government.  We do 
not pursue that line of analysis here, though we invite others to do so. 
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that the same Constitution would impose a lesser duty on the Federal 
Government”122 than it imposes on the States.  To the contrary, because the “equal 
protection” constraints on the two levels of government stem from independent 
constitutional sources, it is eminently thinkable that the federal government might 
have a lesser, or even a greater, duty in some circumstances than do the States.123 
Third, questions about the character of a jurisprudence that takes fiduciary 
duties seriously involve issues different from those we have discussed. Our focus 
has been on discerning constitutional meaning, and we have no trouble saying that 
the federal Constitution means that federal government officials must have 
plausible reasons when discriminating among classes of citizens. That is no more 
difficult than saying that a trustee needs to have good reasons for his or her actions 
when he or she treats some beneficiaries more favorably than other beneficiaries, or 
that an agent must have good reasons for discriminating among principals. The 
strength of the required reasons will vary with context, but an utterly arbitrary 
action by a fiduciary that discriminates among beneficiaries or principals is always 
a breach of duty. The Constitution imposes a similar rule on federal actors, unless 
one can discern specific contexts in which that general requirement does not 
apply.124  But determining how, or even whether, to translate that meaning into 
                                                            
122   347 U.S. at 500. 
 
123   Cf. Steven G. Calabresi, A Madisonian Interpretation of the Equal Protection Doctrine, 91 YALE 
L.J.  1403 (1982) (arguing that Madisonian political theory suggests that equal protection principles 
should apply more strictly to states than to the federal government). 
 
124 One of us has previously hesitated to reach this sweeping a conclusion about a general 
constitutional requirement of reasonableness. See Gary Lawson, Ordinary Powers in Extraordinary 
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real-world constitutional doctrine requires a completely different kind of inquiry 
than we have undertaken here. 
The move from meaning to real-world doctrine requires a theory about a very 
complex relationship between what a document means and how people should 
behave.  Many people assume that once the Constitution’s meaning is discerned, it 
follows naturally that political actors, such as judges, should act in accordance with 
that known meaning.   As one of us has emphasized to tedium, however, that is an 
assumption far less inevitable than widespread.125 
Propositions about constitutional meaning are factual statements whose 
truth or falsity is determined by the tools of interpretative theory, while 
propositions about constitutional doctrine, which purport to dictate appropriate 
conduct, are normative claims whose truth or falsity must be determined by 
political and moral theory. Evidence that supports one kind of claim may or may not 
support other kinds of claims.  Even assuming that constitutional meaning is 
relevant to constitutional action, it is far from obvious that adjudication either can 
or should directly apply what one regards as the correct theory of constitutional 
meaning (whatever that theory may be). Adjudication takes place in real time, with 
limited resources. Anyone who says that there is no price tag on justice understands 
neither price tags nor justice. It is virtually inevitable that any sensible, workable 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
Times: Common Sense in Times of Crisis, 87 B.U.L. REV. 289, 309 (2007). But one must go where the 
evidence leads, and that is where the evidence leads. 
 
125   See, e.g., Gary Lawson, On Reading Recipes . . . and Constitutions, 85 GEO. L.J. 1823 (1997). 
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system of adjudication will adopt shortcuts, or rules of thumb, for dealing with 
recurring situations, which almost certainly means that some decisions that are 
adjudicatively “correct” will be interpretatively “wrong,” simply because getting the 
interpretatively “correct” answer would be too costly.126  A theory of adjudication 
probably cannot follow in a straight line from a theory of interpretation even if the 
conceptual and normative gap between meaning and adjudication can be bridged. 
Thus, we present here no theory about the appropriate way to translate 
constitutional meaning into constitutional adjudication. We conclude only that the 
Constitution’s meaning includes fiduciary obligations on federal officials; we do not 
say whether courts can or should enforce those obligations in any particular fashion. 
In the end, we do not believe that the Constitution prescribes precise and 
detailed answers to what constitutes “reasonable cause,” any more than the law of 
trusts provides precise and detailed answers to every question of how to execute a 
power of appointment. We maintain only that the original Constitution poses those 
questions. If one wants to call those questions, and the need of governmental 
fiduciaries to answer them in the course of executing official duties, a species of 
“federal equal protection,” we do not object strongly to that label. And if one wants 
to describe the process of discerning the character and strength of the needed 
reasons for action as a “moral reading”127 or “philosophical approach”128 to 
                                                            
126   See Gary Lawson, Originalism without Obligation, -- B.U.L. REV. – (2013) (forthcoming). 
 
127   See James E. Fleming, Living Originalism and Living Constitutionalism as Moral Readings of 
the American Constitution, 92 B.U.L. REV. 1171, 1173 (2012). 
 
128 See SOTIRIOS A. BARBER & JAMES E. FLEMING, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION: THE BASIC 
QUESTIONS 155-70 (2007). 
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constitutional interpretation, we do not object strongly to those labels either. We 
think, however, that “fiduciary approach” better describes the required inquiry. 
This is because our focus is on the distinctively legal content of fiduciary 
understandings that underlie the Constitution’s meaning, rather than on some 
abstract moral or political theory. 
All of which brings us back to the facts of Bolling v. Sharpe. We cannot see 
any good reason why schools in the District of Columbia should have been 
segregated by race. Access to government facilities is precisely the sort of thing that 
seems to call for a presumption of equal access by all beneficiaries. Race does not 
rebut that presumption when the disadvantaged people are among the principals to 
whom agencies owe duties of impartiality. If Congress is bound by fiduciary duties 
when legislating for the District of Columbia, and if constitutional meaning should 
drive constitutional decision making, Bolling is quite an easy case to decide. 
Were Congress acting pursuant to the Necessary and Proper Clause, we 
would have no trouble saying that that clause incorporates the background rules of 
fiduciary duty and forbids discrimination based on race.  But Congress in Bolling 
did not act pursuant to the Necessary and Proper Clause. It acted pursuant to the 
Enclave Clause, which authorizes Congress “[t]o exercise exclusive Legislation in all 
Cases whatsoever, over such District (not exceeding ten Miles square) as may, by 
Cession of particular States, and the Acceptance of Congress, become the Seat of the 
Government of the United States . . . . ”129  Do fiduciary duties apply to Congress 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
 
129   U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 17. 
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only through the Necessary and Proper Clause, or do they apply as background 
principles through the law of agency? 
In previous work, one of us has said the former,130 but he now thinks that is 
mistaken, for the reasons that we have already given. The Necessary and Proper 
Clause confirms and clarifies the agency-law character of the Constitution as it 
applies to Congress, but it does not create or exhaust that character. Members of 
Congress are agents, just as are executive and judicial officials. They are fiduciaries, 
just as are executive and judicial officials. That is true whether they are legislating 
under the Necessary and Proper Clause, the District Clause, or the Weights and 
Measures Clause.131  This conclusion is strengthened by ratification-era 
representations from the Constitution’s advocates that the Necessary and Proper 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
 
130   See Gary Lawson, Delegation and Original Meaning, 88 VA. L. REV. 327, 391-94 (2002). 
 
131   Because one of the chief fiduciary responsibilities of an agent is to exercise the duties of the 
agency personally, see Natelson, supra note 11, at 58-59, the fiduciary character of the Constitution, 
rather than the Necessary and Proper Clause as Professor Lawson has previously said, see Lawson, 
supra note 129, at 392-93,  establishes a nondelegation principle. Does that mean that the President 
must personally serve warrants and make arrests?  Of course not, because the “executive Power” is a 
power either to exercise or to supervise execution—to “take Care that the Laws be faithfully 
executed,” not necessarily to execute them personally. It does mean, however, that judges who 
delegate the effective case-deciding power to law clerks are behaving unconstitutionally and are 
therefore subject to impeachment and removal. 
Accordingly, the nondelegation doctrine applies to exercises of Congress’s power under the 
District Clause and the Territories Clause. Territorial legislatures may therefore be 
unconstitutional, absent some way to read a permission to delegate into the District and Territories 
Clauses. This was Professor Lawson’s original view when considering the matter, see Gary Lawson, 
Territorial Governments and the Limits of Formalism, 78 CAL. L. REV. 853, 900-905 (1990), which he 
changed when he thought that only the Necessary and Proper Clause imported the nondelegation 
principle into the portions of the Constitution that empower Congress. He would appear to have been 
right the first time. Also, it means that there is no free pass for Congress when it comes to managing 
federal lands or other property, again contrary to Professor Lawson’s earlier position. See Lawson, 
supra note 129, at 392-94. 
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Clause was a mere recital of rules that would have been implicit in the Constitution 
in any event.132 
If Congress wants to treat people in the District of Columbia differentially, it 
is not categorically forbidden from so doing, any more than holders of unlimited 
powers of appointment are forbidden categorically from giving different amounts to 
beneficiaries. But Congress, like other kinds of trustees, needs reasonable cause for 
that action, and in the case of Bolling, reasonable cause was nowhere to be found. 
                                                            
132   See Natelson, supra note 72, at 100-01. 
 
